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Despite the widespread impression that any-
one can teach history, and almost anyone can 
write it, the talents of lawyers and historians 
are actually rather disjoint. Historians are typ-
ically distance runners, mulling alone for years 
over obscure primary sources to come up with 
lengthy, sometimes deep, but rarely dazzling 
narratives. They synthesize; they write books. 
In contrast, attorneys are sprinters, working on 
tight deadlines, usually handling too many 
cases in too many areas of the law, rarely hav-
ing either the time or the inclination to make 
sense of it all. They cross-examine; they write 
briefs. 
Laughlin McDonald, director of the ACLU's 
Southern Regional Office in Atlanta since 1972, 
is a superb courtroom lawyer with the soul of 
a historian. In this book, he brilliantly analyzes 
the convoluted tangle of restrictions on black 
electoral rights in Georgia, restrictions that he 
himself has done much to unravel, drawing 
heavily on the records of cases he argued. If 
you ever believed that voting was simple, that 
racial discrimination in politics ended almost 
immediately after the passage of the Voting 
Rights Act in 1965, or that the Supreme Court 
of the 1990s was only attempting to restore a 
previously "colorblind" process in its "racial 
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gerrymandering" decisions, this coolly objec-
tive, quietly passionate book will change your 
mind. 
Many historians, social commentators, and 
everyday citizens, black and non-black alike, 
seem to believe today that American race rela-
tions have almost no history. In this radically 
foreshortened view, slavery, a tale of unending 
woe, gave way after the Civil War to a quasi-
slavery that was broken only when the civil 
rights marches of the 1960s somehow briefly 
appealed to the American conscience. Irra-
tional discriminatory laws were repealed, but 
white racism remained, along with hopeless 
black ghettoes. Laws cannot really change prac-
tices or attitudes, many people assume, and to 
attempt that project is at best ineffective and at 
worst counter-productive. To optimists of this 
persuasion, continued governmental action in 
favor of minorities is futile, because whites are 
now as enlightened as they will ever be, and 
laws are or should be rigidly unconscious of 
color. Affirmative action and voting rights laws 
should be repealed or very tightly constrained. 
To pessimists, continued governmental action 
is also futile, because racist whites will never 
change. 
As both historian and reformer, McDonald 
takes a more nuanced approach. "One of the 
most striking, and perhaps one of the most re-
assuring, things about the black odyssey in 
pursuit of equal voting rights," he remarks, "is 
that it demonstrates that racial attitudes are not 
immutable but are in a profound sense self-
serving eco!lomic, political, legal, and social 
conventions" (5). All of the dire predictions 
from southern white politicians about the per-
I' !I 
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ils of allowing African-Americans to vote freely 
or of abolishing legal segregation have proven 
false, while two that they silently feared-that 
whites would renounce formal segregation and 
accept black voting-have come true. To a na-
tive white South Carolinian like McDonald, 
Georgia's example proves that there has been 
both more change and more continuity in race 
relations than some denizens of colder climes 
realize. On the one hand, the changes between 
the B.C.E. (before civil rights era) and A.D. (af-
ter Martin Luther King, Jr.'s death) periods seem 
much more real than, for instance, Derrick Bell 
recognizes, and law has been a much more po-
tent producer of those changes than, for exam-
ple, Gerald Rosenberg allows. On the other 
hand, there have been many more continuities 
than such "colorblind" theorists as Stephan 
and Abigail Thernstrom admit. 1 Just as im-
portant, the agents of the changes in voting 
rights that McDonald chronicles-ordinary 
black folk and their lawyers, not nationally 
known civil rights heroes and heroines-serve 
to validate the still-controversial changes 
themselves by providing further evidence that 
widely celebrated African-Americans are not 
the only ones who can use law and political 
power strategically and responsibly. 
In the first election in which African-Ameri-
cans could vote in Georgia, in April1868, white 
Democrats violently and unsuccessfully at-
tacked blacks, who were almost unanimously 
Republican, beginning a long tradition of po-
litical discrimination that was simultaneously 
racial and partisan. By September, Democrats 
in the legislature had secured enough white Re-
publican support to pass a resolution expelling 
all black legislators, on the grounds that nei-
ther the Fifteenth Amendment nor Georgia's 
post-Civil War constitution explicitly pro-
tected blacks' right to hold office. Only the na-
tional government's intervention ended this 
first attempt to differentiate between the power 
to vote and that to elect a candidate of African-
Americans' choice. 
Both Republicans and Democrats, from the 
1860s on, understood perfectly well which po-
litical rules and structures fostered black po-
litical power and which impeded it, and they 
manipulated these rules at the earliest oppor-
tunity. Thus, the Republican-majority state leg-
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islature of 1870 mandated ward elections for 
Atlanta and Macon, and black aldermen won 
office for the first time in each city, much to the 
consternation of Democrats. Republicans also 
decreed that school boards throughout the state 
were to be elected by wards or, in rural areas, 
by militia districts. The 1870 legislature passed 
further bills protecting voters on the way to or 
at the polls, and prohibiting officials from re-
quiring that poll taxes be paid before a male 
citizen could register to vote. Nonetheless, vi-
olence and intimidation carried the Democrats 
into control of the legislature and the gover-
nor's office in 1871. As McDonald notes, "From 
1867 to 1872, at least a quarter of the state's 
black legislators were jailed, threatened, 
bribed, beaten, or killed" (35). Soon after the 
1871 legislature convened, the Democratic ma-
jority revised rules that had benefitted African-
American voters, substituting at-large for ward 
elections, reinstituting the poll tax, repealing 
the anti-intimidation law, and providing for the 
appointment, rather than the election, of school 
board members. In policies and personnel, 
Georgia government was thereafter increas-
ingly bleached out. By 1874, there were only 
three blacks in the lower house of the state leg-
islature and but one in the upper. As Georgia 
sprang ahead of the rest of the South in pass-
ing politically restrictive laws, it pioneered, as 
well, in the speed at which blacks lost office 
during Reconstruction. At the state's 1877 con-
stitutional convention, Georgia Democrats 
made the poll tax permanent and cumulative; 
to register, a man had to pay all poll taxes as-
sessed on him since his 2}St birthday or since 
1877. This may have been the single most ef-
fective disfranchisement law ever passed. 
These were not the only kinds of election 
laws passed. Registration laws allowed offi-
cials-virtually all Democrats from 1871 to the 
1970s-to expand the electorate if votes were 
needed or contract it if certain kinds of voters 
1 Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for 
l\acial justice (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Gerald N. 
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About So-
cial Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); 
Stephan Thernstrom and Abigail Thernstrom, America in 
Black and White: One Nation, Indivisiblr, Racr in Modern 
America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997). 
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were threatening. Crimes that blacks were 
more likely than whites to be convicted of, such 
as larceny, were added to the short list of of-
fenses that barred men from the voting rolls. 
Electoral districts were gerrymandered and 
over- or under-populated to insure that only 
white Democrats won. White primary laws 
shut African-Americans out of the most im-
portant elections. To end any possibility of a 
surge of black voting strength, Georgia Dem-
ocrats passed a state constitutional amendment 
in 1908 that provided that voters had to be ei-
ther literate, or own 40 acres of land or $500 
worth of property. Exceptions allowed military 
veterans or their descendants or people of 
"good character" to register to vote-all crude 
subterfuges to facilitate racial discrimination 
by registrars. No African-American served in 
the Georgia state legislature from 1908 to 1962, 
and Jefferson Long, who served from Decem-
ber 1870 through March 1871, was the state's 
only black member of Congress before 1972. 
Still, some blacks, most notably in Atlanta 
and Macon, managed to register to vote in the 
1920s and 30s, and after the outlawing of the 
white primary in Texas in Smith v. Allwright 
(321 U.S. 649 [1944]) in 1944, African-Ameri-
cans flooded the registration rolls in Georgia 
more than in any other Deep South state. In 
1940, only about 20,000 blacks had been regis-
tered to vote; by 1948, 125,000 were. Coinci-
dentally, the poll tax was repealed in 1945, 
when the arch racist Eugene Talmadge appar-
ently calculated that its abolition would assist 
his 1946 gubernatorial campaign. Repeal was 
intended to facilitate poor white, not black vot-
ing, and in some cities in the state, the payment 
of all taxes continued to be enforced as a reg-
istration requirement as late as 1970. Nonethe-
less, the substantial elimination of the poll tax 
requirement gave election officials one less 
weapon against black suffrage. 
With the two chief barriers to black political 
participation down, other bars were raised to 
fill the same functions. Literacy and under-
standing tests were made much more difficult, 
requiring voters, for example, to name all of the 
counties in the voter's judicial district and de-
fine "republican government" to the satisfac-
tion of a registrnr. Drawing more on the records 
of state and federal trials of the 1970s, HOs, and 
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90s than any other historian of recent black suf-
frage has, McDonald shows how various ver-
sions of the literacy test were administered in 
practice, how challenges to black voters were 
resolved, and how intimidation took place. 
Election officials in heavily black precincts even 
deliberately slowed down the voting so that 
blacks would be left waiting in line when the 
polls closed. Often, the tactics were less subtle. 
When black schoolteacher Wilson Roberson 
went to the Bleckley County Courthouse to try 
to register to vote in 1955, the chief of police 
unceremoniously escorted him out, telling him 
that "No niggers register in this courthouse," 
which was then the only place in the county 
where anyone could register (56). Purge laws al-
lowed registrars to delete from the lists many 
blacks who did manage to register. In his in-
augural address in 1955, Gov. Marvin Griffin 
called for "a solid white vote" to preserve le-
gal segregation and discrimination (72). 
Georgia's statute books were not only 
stained by laws providing for pervasive racial 
separation, from birth in Jim Crow hospitals 
to burial in segregated graveyards, they also 
contained the unique "county unit" system of 
electing certain statewide officials. From 1917 
to 1963, a majority or even a plurality of the 
popular vote was not necessary to win these 
elections, so long as a candidate got a major-
ity of the county unit votes, which were allo-
cated identically to the grossly malappor-
tioned state house seats. By 1960, the eight 
counties with the largest populations con-
tained 41% of the population, but only 12% of 
the house members and county unit votes. 
The 103 smallest counties held 22% of the 
population, but were allocated a majority of 
the house and county unit representation. 
Rural areas in the sparsely settled, largely 
white mountains and the rural "black belt" 
counties, where few of the numerous blacks 
were allowed to register, controlled the state's 
politics, heavily supporting the Talmadge 
and Griffin wing of the Democratic party. The 
county unit system, as Gov. Ernest Vandiver 
lamented, after it was struck down by the 
Supreme Court in Gray v. Sanders (372 U.S. 
368 [1963]), had been "a bulwark against ... 
big city and minority bloc control" (84). The 
malapportioned legislature, another bulwark, 
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quickly followed the county unit system into 
legal oblivion. 
Before these changes could go into effect, 
however, the unreformed legislature countered 
by adopting a provision sponsored by "liberal" 
Governor-elect Carl E. Sanders providing for 
at-large elections for the state senate in coun-
ties with more than one state senator. This 1962 
bill, McDonald shows, was an effort to defeat 
black Atlanta attorney Leroy Johnson, who was 
then running for the state senate. Unfortu-
nately for Sanders, the statute blatantly vio-
lated the state constitution, which could not be 
amended quickly enough to overthrow the dis-
trict system before Johnson became the first 
black state legislator in Georgia elected in 54 
years. A more effective attempt to curb "the 
bloc vote," a phrase synonymous at the time 
with the black vote, required candidates to re-
ceive a majority of the votes in primaries and 
general elections. Sponsored by Denmark 
Groover, leader of the segregationist/ county 
unit forces in the last legislative session in 
which they were in control of the Georgia 
House, 1963-64, and also endorsed by the 
Sanders Administration, the majority-vote pro-
vision had a well-advertised racial purpose. In 
any election district where black voters were in 
the minority, whites could divide their support 
between two or more white candidates in the 
primary and then unite to defeat a black can-
didate in the runoff. Like other discriminatory 
rules and structures, the majority vote require-
ment inhibited minority candidacies, as calcu-
lating politicians avoided hopeless contests. 
Legal, extra-legal, and even blatantly illegal 
practices marred Georgia elections in the 1950s 
and early 60s. Civil rights workers who urged 
a boycott of still-segregated schools in Ameri-
cus in 1963 were charged with "insurrection," 
a capital offense under a law that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional 
thirty years earlier (113). Seventeen municipal-
ities and 48 counties in the state required seg-
regated polling places as late as 1962. When the 
Justice Department filed suit to end the prac-
tice, a local Macon leader charged that the fed-
eral government was destroying "every vestige 
of local government." In Terrell County, Sher-
iff Zeke Matthews broke up civil rights meet-
ings, threatened civil rights workers, and jailed 
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voter registration campaigners on trumped-up 
charges. When arsonists burned a black church 
where civil rights meetings had been held and 
someone fired a shotgun into a house where 
civil rights workers were staying, wounding 
one of them, the local Terrell County newspa-
per speculated that publicity-seeking blacks 
were the culprits. Local whites eventually 
confessed to the arson. In 1960, only five 
African-Americans had managed to register in 
majority-black Terrell County, and Student 
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee work-
ers struggled without much success to register 
more.2 
Their task was eased by the enactment of the 
Voting Rights Act in 1965. In the three years af-
ter passage, the proportion of African-Ameri-
cans registered in Georgia jumped from 27<Yo to 
53%, and reached 54% in "Terrible Terrell." But 
registration remained complicated, and elec-
tion officers continued to exercise discretionary 
authority over the process. Local and state of-
ficials maintained or even heightened struc-
tural barriers to black political power, despite 
Section Five of the Act, which required any 
changes in election laws in "covered jurisdic-
tions" like Georgia to be pre-cleared by the Jus-
tice Department before being put into effect. 
Many Georgia jurisdictions initially ignored 
Section 5. Of 11 counties with significant black 
populations that changed the form of elections 
for county government from single-member 
districts to at-large and 14 that adopted at-large 
elections for school boards from 1964 to 1970, 
only one sought pre-clearance under Section 5. 
Twenty-three municipalities amended their 
charters after 1968 to require majorities, rather 
than pluralities, to elect city officials. In several 
cases, black candidates had recently come close 
to election under the plurality system, sug-
gesting that the shifts to majority-vote regimes 
were made to avoid electing African-Ameri-
cans. Few of these changes were submitted for 
pre-clearance. 
Less dramatic than civil rights marches, sit-
2 By 1963, only 98, or 2.4'X, of the blacks of voting age in 
Terrell County were registered. U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights, Political Participation (Washington, DC: U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights, 1968), 236-37. 
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ins, or violence, changes in the structure of lo-
cal governments have rarely attracted the at-
tention of historians. As the Georgia examples 
prove, however, the legal strategy of southern 
white supremacists-scream "states' rights" 
and manipulate electoral rules-remained strik-
ingly constant from the First Reconstruction in 
the 19th century to its successor 100 years later. 
Whether the Second Reconstruction would 
erode into a Second Redemption depended on 
the diligence and skill with which lawyers 
shaped and used the Voting Rights Act and the 
Constitution after 1965. Although he does not 
directly discuss his role, through litigation, con-
sultation, and scholarship, Laughlin McDonald 
was one of the central figures in molding the 
Voting Rights Act over the course of the 1970s 
and 80s. 
While the Civil Rights Division of Lyndon 
Johnson's Justice Department was too preoc-
cupied with voter registration to issue regula-
tions for Section 5, Richard Nixon's found time. 
Fifteen of the 22 Georgia counties that shifted 
to at-large elections for county or school board 
elections from 1971 to 1976 eventually submit-
ted the changes for pre-clearance. Only two 
were allowed to put the changes into effect. 
Thirty Georgia cities adopted majority-vote re-
quirements in this period, and Justice objected 
to 26 of them. This pattern did not simply rep-
resent the liberalism or fidelity to the law's pur-
poses of the Administration that introduced the 
phrase "southern strategy" into national par-
lance. Local representatives of minority groups, 
usually with advice from lawyers, took active 
parts in the pre-clearance process. However 
messy and ad hoc that process was, once insti-
tutionalized and blessed by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Allen v. Board of Elections 
(393 U.S. 544 [1969]), Section 5 did effectively 
prevent changes in the form of elections that 
would have worsened the positions of minori-
ties. Nonetheless, white bloc voting slowed the 
integration of elective office. In 311 election 
contests between black and white candidates 
from 1970 to 1990, only an average of 12-14'X, 
of whites voted for a black candidate. In 1975, 
only 21 of 236 members of the legislature, two 
of 530 mayors, and fewer than 2% of the mem-
bers of county governing boards in Georgia 
were black (153). 
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To speed political integration, voting rights 
lawyers employed not only Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, concentrating on changes in 
election laws that had never been submitted for 
pre-clearance, but also Section 2 of the Act and 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution. At-large elections were 
the principal target. Between 1972 and 1987, the 
ACLU and other public-interest and private 
lawyers challenged at-large elections in 134 
Georgia counties, towns, cities, and school 
boards, forcing changes to district elections in 
nearly all instances. From mammoth Fulton 
County (Atlanta) to tiny Putnam County 
(Eatonton), conditions were similar: a history 
of segregation and discrimination, exclusion of 
blacks from white churches and civic organi-
zations where local political connections were 
nurtured, racial bloc voting, discrimination in 
governmental services, and few or no elected 
African-American officials. Under the standard 
established by the Supreme Court in White v. 
Regester (412 U.S. 755 [1973]), lawyers for mi-
norities could win by checking off a series of 
factors that showed an overall discriminatory 
effect. The shift from at-large to district systems 
encouraged black candidacies and facilitated 
black victories. Between 1980 and 1990, the 
number of African-American county commis-
sioners in the state rose from 20 to 97, the num-
ber of black municipal officeholders, from 146 
to 246. District elections were necessary to elect 
such candidates because racial bloc voting per-
sisted. 
The White v. Regester standard was tem-
porarily displaced by the Supreme Court's 1980 
decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden (446 U.S. 55 
[1980]) that there could be no violation under 
Section 2 without proving intent. As a result of 
Bolden, the Justice Department and public in-
terest groups stopped filing Section 2 suits and 
defendants ceased offering settlements. In re-
sponse, the civil rights community, including 
McDonald, massed to amend Section 2 when 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was up for 
renewal in 1982. After skillful lobbying and 
devastating testimony about the continuation 
of discriminat_ory behavior, an addition to Sec-
tion 2 that essentially overruled Bolden was 
adopted by a landslide bipartisan majority over 
the tepid opposition of the Reagan Adminis-
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tration. Accompanied by an extensive Senate 
report that effectively wrote the constitutional 
standards of White v. Regester into Section 2law, 
the strengthened Voting Rights ACt seemed to 
represent a political consensus that the protec-
tion of minority voting rights ranked next to 
population equality as a value in the design of 
electoral structures. Although arising out of an 
at-large election case (Bolden), the amended 
Section 2 would be applied most controver-
sially to redistricting. 
Beginning in the 1960s with the population 
equality challenges, at least one statewide re-
districting plan in Georgia has been success-
fully challenged in federal court in every 
decade. In response to the Justice Department's 
refusal to pre-clear the 1971 state legislative 
plan, the state contended that the Voting Rights 
Act did not apply to redistricting, or that if it 
did, it was unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court rejected the state's arguments in Georgia 
v. U.S. (411 U.S. 526 [1973]). In its congressional 
plan of that year, the line-drawers split Atlanta 
between three districts, carefully excluding the 
residences of the leading black candidates and 
including the addresses of potential white can-
didates in a central Atlanta district designed to 
be only 38% black, in order, as its legislative 
sponsor publicly announced, to ensure the elec-
tion of "a white, moderate, Democratic Con-
gressman." The legislature, which was obvi-
ously unconcerned with district appearance, 
drew another district shaped, according to an 
Atlanta journalist, like a turkey's neck and in 
places, "as skinny as a flamingo's leg" (150). 
Apparently uninterested in avian similes, the 
Department of Justice ignored the ungainly dis-
trict, but objected to the Atlanta cracking as a 
dilution of minority voting power. In response, 
the legislature redrew the lines, and in the 1972 
election, Andrew Young became, along with 
Barbara Jordan of Houston, one of the first two 
black members of Congress from the South 
elected since 1898. 
In 1981, the Justice Department again lodged 
a Section 5 objection against the state legisla-
tive plans, and when the legislature redrew 
them, the number of majority-black house seats 
was increased from 24 to 30, and the number 
of senate districts, from two to eight. The con-
gressional districts of the 1980s, like those of 
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the 1970s, wen• unaesthetic, "snaking across 
the map of Georgia," as one of the plan's sup-
porters in the state senate put it, or, as an op-
ponent in the state house remarked, "one of the 
most outlandish things I have seen since I've 
been in the legislature" (168). Once again, the 
Justice Department refused to play art critic, 
but it did object to the configuration of the At-
lanta district that Andrew Young had occupied 
until he left to become the U.S. representative 
at the United Nations. His successor was a lib-
eral white Democrat. Even though the legisla-
ture had increased the district's black percent-
age, Justice announced that the plan would not 
be pre-cleared because it had a discriminatory 
intent. Georgia sued in the District of Colum-
bia court to force pre-clearance, but lost igno-
miniously when two legislators testified that 
redistricting committee chair Joe Mack Wilson 
announced in private that he would never al-
low a congressional district to contain a work-
ing black majority because "I don't want to 
draw nigger districts" (170). When the three-
judge District of Columbia Court officially de-
clared that "Representative Joe Mack Wilson is 
a racist"3 and forced the plan to be redrafted to 
increase the black proportion of the Atlanta dis-
trict, Wilson exploded: "[I]f you don't conde-
scend and give in to everything black people 
want, you're tagged a racist" (173). The Supreme 
Court quickly affirmed the decision. 
Before the 1990s redistricting, the Supreme 
Court issued one major decision interpreting 
the revised Section 2, Thornburg v. Gingles (478 
U.S. 30 [1986]). Drawing on an article that orig-
inated as congressional testimony by a voting 
rights lawyer during the debate over the Vot-
ing Rights Act, Justice William Brennan spot-
lighted three of the nine "Senate Report fac-
tors." A Section 2 violation would be found 
where there was a sufficiently large and geo-
graphically compact minority group to form a 
district within the larger jurisdiction, where the 
minority typically voted as a bloc, and where 
whites usually voted en bloc to defeat minority-
preferred candidates. The widely agreed-on 
implication of Gingles for redistricting was that, 
if it was possible to draw a district in which mi-
3 Busbee v. Smith, 549 F.Supp. 494, at 500 (D. D. C. !982). 
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norities could elect their candidate of choice, a 
jurisdiction that failed to do so could expect to 
lose a subsequent Section 2 case. Gingles gave 
blacks, Native Americans, Latinos, and an ac-
tivist Civil Rights Division of the Justice De-
partment unprecedented leverage over redis-
tricting, and they used it nowhere more openly 
and effectively than in Georgia. 
During the 1980s, the Atlanta congressional 
district was the only one of the state's 10 that 
was majority black in population, and it was 
the only one to elect an African-American 
member of Congress.4 Besides Gingles, three 
other factors facilitated an expansion in black 
representation in 1991. First, the growth of the 
state's population had given Georgia another 
congressional seat, which meant that a new dis-
trict could be carved out without necessarily 
displacing any incumbent. Second, the simul-
taneous growth of the number of black legisla-
tors and (white) Republican legislators meant 
that African-Americans made up a larger pro-
portion of the legislative Democrats than at any 
previous redistricting. And third, the legisla-
tive leaders, keenly aware of the Justice De-
partment's rejection of the plans of the 1970s 
and 80s, and humiliated by the redneck image 
left by Joe Mack Wilson's 1981 remark, wished 
to avoid yet another rebuff. Blacks pressed for 
three majority-black seats among the state's to-
tal of 11, which would have approximated their 
27% of the state's population. When the legis-
lature voted for only two, the Justice Depart-
ment refused to pre-clear the plan, pointing to 
a third majority-black district in the "Max 
Black" plan, which had been drawn by ACLU 
lawyers and endorsed by the legislative black 
caucus and the state's major black organiza-
tions. The legislature came back with two seats 
in which African-Americans comprised a ma-
jority of the voting age population and a third 
where they were 45'Y.,. Again the Department 
of Justice rejected the plan, seemingly con-
vinced by evidence that the current extent of 
racial bloc voting in Georgia usually prevented 
the election of candidates that were the first 
choices of black communities except in major-
ity-black districts. This time, the legislature 
pushed three districts over the 50% black vot-
ing age population threshold, and Justice al-
lowed the plan to go into effect. In 1992, for the 
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first time in the state's history, Georgia sent to 
Washington more than one African-American 
member of Congress. In the 11 states of the 
former Confederacy as a whole, the number of 
black members of Congress skyrocketed from 
five in 1990 to 17 in 1992, all from majority-
black districts. 
In the Second Reconstruction, as in the First, 
when black faces in positions of power multi-
plied, whites lashed back by reshaping the law. 
After Shaw v. Reno (509 U.S. 630 [1993]) removed 
the requirement that those who challenged sub-
stantially minority electoral districts had to 
prove that they were injured or discriminated 
against or that the legislature intended to dis-
criminate against them-requirements that mi-
nority plaintiffs attacking electoral structures 
under the Constitution continue to have to 
prove-several white Georgians, including 
a losing Democratic congressional candidate 
who no longer lived in the district he ques-
tioned, filed suit asking that the new 11th con-
gressional district be declared unconstitutional. 
By a 2-1 vote, a federal judicial panel con-
demned the 11th, partly because the district's 
irregular shape and racial composition indi-
cated an intent to distinguish between people 
on the grounds of race-a standard never be-
fore or since applied to districts dominated by 
whites-and partly because of the influence of 
what it termed the "direct link" between the 
ACLU, the legislative black caucus, and the 
U.S. Department of Justice in the state's redis-
tricting. In a doubtless unconscious echo of the 
1868 Georgia legislature's expulsion of its 
African-American members, the outraged 
judges implicitly treated the 1991legislature as 
lily-white, declaring that, after the adoption of 
the final redistricting plan, "The ACLU was ex-
uberant. Georgia officials and citizens were 
mystified" (217, quoting Johnson v. Miller, 864 
F.Supp. at 1368). But under the Voting Rights 
Act, the Justice Department has a special re-
sponsibility to protect minority rights in the 
electoral process, and comments from inter-
ested groups have always been necessary to 
4 When the white incumbent, Wyche Fowler, moved up 
to the Senate in 1986, he was replaced by John Lewis, a 
former leader of the civil rights movement. 
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carry out the congressional intent in passing 
Section 5. Moreover, although the judges, one 
supposes, did not mean to deny that black leg-
islators were officials or citizens, their pre-
sumption about the normative color of power 
was palpable. 
Georgia, the United States, and minority in-
tervenors represented by the ACLU appealed, 
and in Miller v. Johnson (512 U.S. 622 [1995]), 
the same 5-4 majority that had decided Shaw 
affirmed the lower court's decision in the Geor-
gia case in even more sweeping terms than 
Shaw had employed. Completely disregarding 
the state's history of racial discrimination in the 
voting and redistricting processes and every 
other aspect of its political culture, a history 
that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, echoing the 
ACLU's brief, pointedly rehearsed in her dis-
sent in the case, Justice Anthony Kennedy's 
majority opinion announced that district shapes 
did not matter so long as the "predominant fac-
tor" in drawing a district was racial and that 
the district did not even have to be majority-
minority to be unconstitutional. Abjuring any 
discussion of the facts of Georgia's political life, 
Kennedy's opinion seemed to assume that 
Georgia electoral laws had always been color-
blind until 1991, that every irregularity in the 
1990s district lines had a racial, rather than a 
partisan or personal explanation, and that 
racial bloc voting was non-existent in the state. 
No one reading McDonald's book can doubt 
that Kennedy's opinion was completely di-
vorced from either history or current reality. 
On remand, the increasingly confident lawyers 
for the plaintiffs and the eagerly cooperative 
district court majority declared the other non-
Atlanta black-majority district unconstitu-
tional, even though it looked much prettier 
than the 11th on a map.5 When the legislature 
deadlocked, pleading confusion about the new 
standards, the district court drastically redrew 
every district in the state. The court justified its 
remapping of the 11th district on the grounds 
that in the redesigned district, Interstate 85 
served as "a very real connecting cable"h of the 
district's counties, a justification that McDon-
ald charitably treats as ironic, since the 12th 
North Carolina district ruled unconstitutional 
in Shaw had been characterized as "bizarre" 
and "irrational on its face" by the Supreme 
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Court for following that same highway farther 
north (221). Although the plan of the two Dem-
ocratic district court judges unpacked blacks in 
ways that state politicians believed favored 
white Democratic congressional candidates, 
the only Democrats elected to Congress in the 
next election, in 1996, were the three black in-
cumbents, one in the predominantly African-
American Atlanta district, the second in a dis-
trict that was majority black by 2000, and the 
third in a district that by the 2000 census was 
only 41% black in total population. These last 
two members of Congress won their primary 
races because whites either stayed home or 
voted in the Republican primary, and their gen-
eral elections, in racially polarized contests, by 
invoking the party loyalties of enough white 
Democrats to win in overwhelmingly Demo-
cratic districts. 
In the Miller litigation, Georgia had defended 
its plan in cooperation with the Justice Depart-
ment and the ACLU. After the district court's 
second decision, however, the state switched 
sides and contended that its initial plan, which 
had two majority-black districts, was the prod-
uct of "the illegal excesses of the DOJ." Again, 
the same 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court af-
firmed, disregarding the detail, stressed by Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer in dissent, that the Justice 
Department's disagreements with the state be-
gan only after Georgia had adopted a two-dis-
trict plan on its own, and treating the fact that 
30-39% of whites voted for a black candidate 
in the general election in two districts as demon-
strating a "general willingness" of whites to 
vote for black candidates7 (223). A parallel and 
'even more complicated story of the state leg-
islative redistricting had the state first expand-
ing, and then after Miller, contracting the num-
ber of majority-African-American districts, but 
black politicians, having demonstrated to 
white voters that they could represent anyone, 
regardless of race, hanging on in the new dis-
tricts in 1996 and 1998. 
Facts like widespread racially polarized vot-
5 Johnson v. Miller, 922 F.Supp. 1552 (S.D. Ga. 1995). 
6 Ibid., p. 1564. 
7 Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997). 
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ing and unsubtle racial appeals even in statewide 
election campaigns, which continued to be-
smirch Georgia politics through the 1990s, did 
not seem to matter to the majority of either the 
district court or the Supreme Court. They were 
much more intent on asserting that the exis-
tence of minority opportunity districts would 
exacerbate racial tensions, stigmatize someone, 
or deprive whites of representation. Georgia's 
experience during the 1990s, McDonald shows, 
bears out none of these dire speculations. 
Rather than absorbing the evidence, judges 
were busy brandishing double standards. 
Oddly shaped majority-white districts raised 
no suspicions, while convoluted lines bound-
ing majority-minority districts were nearly con-
clusive proof of constitutional violations.8 The 
three congressional districts that in Georgia av-
eraged a 58-42 racial breakdown were tarred 
with the Shaw charge of "segregation," while 
the eight that averaged an 87-13 balance were 
not, apparently because blacks formed a ma-
jority of the voting age population in the first 
set of districts and whites, in the second. White 
partisan and interest group pressure during re-
districting was only to be expected, and white 
communities of interest never lacked legiti-
macy in the courts' eyes. In contrast, judges 
treated the black legislative caucus, pro-black 
interest groups, and the Justice Department as 
nefarious conspirators, and Justice Kennedy 
denied that black voters, the most politically 
united large group in the country, could form 
a community of interest.9 In the Supreme Court 
majority's "colorblind" world, white was nor-
mal and normative. 
Ever concerned to show how the law shapes 
the lives of ordinary people and is reshaped by 
their struggles, McDonald ends his book with 
a demonstration of the continuing importance 
of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act based on 
the history of the tiny Georgia hamlet of 
Keysville. Although Keysville had been a 
bustling town when it was chartered in 1890, it 
had declined so much by the 1930s that it aban-
doned its local government sometime in that 
decade. Not only was there no mayor, council, 
or bureaucracy, there was also no municipal 
water, no sewer system, no town fire or police 
protection. By 1985, its 300 people, nearly 250 
of whom were African-Americans, were ready 
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to reorganize a town government, but whites 
in the surrounding rural area of Burke County, 
fearing annexation and higher taxes, and 
stereotyping blacks as incapable of governing, 
had come out in opposition to reincorporation. 
Because town records had been lost and land-
marks had been destroyed, the town bound-
aries and, thus, the eligible electorate were 
uncertain, and the effort to recreate the munic-
ipality was tied up by lawsuit after lawsuit filed 
in state courts by white opponents of reincor-
poration. Only Section 5, which required that 
the laws and procedures used to hold a refer-
endum on reorganization and to elect munici-
pal officers be approved by the Justice Depart-
ment, prevented opponents from delaying the 
reestablishment indefinitely. 
With the help of ACLU and Christie Insti-
tute lawyers, Keysville proponents prevailed, 
and in 1990, a town government with a black 
mayor, four black council members, and a fifth 
councilman, a white opponent of incorpora-
tion added for purposes of conciliation, held 
office securely. In the next few years, the town 
and county built a water tower, a fire station, 
a recreation center, a clinic, and a city hall, 
streets were paved, more areas were annexed, 
and more whites, many of whom had initially 
opposed the town's rebirth, were added to the 
government. McDonald has Keysville Mayor 
Emma Gresham conclude his book, in a state-
ment worth quoting in full, both for its re-
flection on the history McDonald has so 
painstakingly analyzed and on the historical 
consciousness and sense of racial morality that 
Gresham exudes: 
I think whites felt threatened, but I very 
much did not want to be guilty of some of 
the things they were guilty of. It takes 
close contact and a lot of communication 
to get across the message that you have 
nothing to fear from the next person. We 
had to prove to whites that we were not 
going to have power and leave them out. 
The burden was on us to include them. 
That approach has done more for race re-
H Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). 
9 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
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lations in this town than anything else. 
(245) 
Perhaps if judges, or at least the law profes-
sors who teach future judges, knew more about 
the realities of politics and power in places like 
Keysville, if they understood the historical de-
velopment of voting rights more fully, if they 
saw that the present reflected both continuity 
and change, judicial decisions would be based 
less on abstraction and conjecture than they 
have been in the past decade. Perhaps if histo-
rians realized how rich the materials produced 
in legal cases are, how much legal cases influ-
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ence lives, and how important the incremental 
changes brought about by largely unheralded 
people were and continue to be, they would re-
discover institutional political history. I can 
think of no better place to begin the reforma-
tions than Laughlin McDonald's splendid book. 
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